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ABSTRACT 
 
The instittuional design of the European Central Bank (ECB) has been the subject 
of considerable political debate. In particular, it has been argued that the Bank 
suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. This article applies the principal-agent 
approach to this debate so as to identify more clearly the logic that underpins the 
basic arguments about the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. Moreover, on the 
assumption that the Bank does suffer from a democratic deficit, the article also 
shows how principal-agent theory can point to the ways in which this problem 
may be addressed. Thus, the principal-agent approach is used as an heuristic 
device to help identify the empirical and normative claims that underpin the 
debate about the accountability of the ECB and how it might be reformed. 
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The introduction of Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
constituted the most important policy development in the European Union (EU) 
in recent times. The creation of a common currency affecting nearly 300 million 
people in one of the world’s wealthiest areas has tremendous implications not 
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just for the economics of Europe but for the global system more generally. At the 
heart of the EMU project is the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which 
is responsible for defining and implementing monetary policy in the 12 EMU 
countries, and the linchpin of the ESCB is the European Central Bank (ECB) itself. 
The ECB has the power to make decisions that directly effect the rate of growth 
and the level of inflation both within EMU countries and outside. At least partly 
for this reason, the ECB has already been the subject of considerable political 
controversy. Some claim that it is an accountable institution that works in the 
best interests of EMU countries. Others, though, assert that the ECB suffers from 
a ‘democratic deficit’. They argue that the citizens of ‘Euroland’ have little or no 
opportunity to shape the decisions that so profoundly affect them. 
 The aim of this article is to recast this debate. It does so by applying the 
principal-agent approach, a variant of rational choice institutionalism, to the 
politics of the ECB. The principal-agent approach is useful as a framework for 
understanding the debate about the Bank’s alleged democratic deficit. It helps to 
conceptualise more clearly the logic underlying the basic positions in an 
otherwise messy and often acrimonious debate. More than that, on the 
assumption that the institutional architecture of the ECB is problematic and that 
the Bank does suffer from a democratic deficit, principal-agent theory also points 
to the ways in which this problem may be remedied. In this article, then, the 
principal-agent approach is being used as an heuristic device to help identify the 
empirical and normative claims that underpin the debate about the 
accountability of the ECB. 
 There are six main parts to the article. The first part outlines the basic 
assumptions of principal-agent theory. The second part sketches the powers of 
the ECB. The third part outlines the debate between the supporters and critics of 
central bank independence in general and the ECB in particular. The fourth part 
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systematically applies principal-agent theory to the ECB, highlighting the logic 
behind conflicting positions of both the defenders and the critics of the Bank. The 
fifth part draws upon principal-agent theory to suggest the most fruitful ways in 
which critics of the Bank might propose that the democratic deficit could be 
alleviated. The final part concludes by reflecting briefly on the principal-agent 
approach itself. 
 
1. The basic assumptions of principal-agent theory 
 
Principal-agent theory is derived from work initially carried out in the field of 
economics. In recent times, though, it has been increasingly applied to the realm 
of political science. In this domain, it can be classified as a branch of rational 
choice institutionalism. Here, the general aim has been to explore issues of 
“institutional design under conditions of imperfect information” (Pollack, 1997, 
p. 101), most notably with regard to the role of public bureaucracies. Whatever 
the subject field and whatever the focus of inquiry, the basic reason why 
principal-agent theory has been so influential is because it is said to “[cut] 
through the inherent complexity of organizational relationships by identifying 
distinct aspects of individuals and their environments that are most worthy of 
investigation, and it integrates these elements into a logically coherent whole” 
(Moe, 1984, p. 757). In short, it is a useful analytical tool for examining real-world 
problems. 
 The principal-agent approach is derived from the so-called ‘new 
economics of organisation’.1 In this context, the basic starting point is the 
situation where one actor (the principal) has an incentive to delegate power to 
another actor (the agent) with the expectation that subsequently the latter will act 
in a way which is consistent with the initial preferences of the former. The 
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incentive to delegate is usually motivated by a desire to reduce transaction costs. 
These costs are incurred because of information asymmetries. In this respect, the 
basic problems are those of adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection refers to the situation where an employer cannot necessarily know 
which candidate is best qualified for a job. Given that all candidates will try to 
sell themselves equally well, the employer may well appoint an applicant whose 
price is greater than their economic value. Moral hazard is the situation where an 
employer cannot know how well a person is working once they have been 
employed. The employer simply cannot observe everything that the employee 
does. Faced with these problems, the solution is to design a contract that 
provides an incentive for the employee to work efficiently. If such a contract can 
be established, then only candidates who truly are well qualified will apply (lazy 
candidates will not) and, once employed, there will be no need for the employer 
to monitor the employee’s behaviour. Thus, principal-agent theory suggests that 
in an ideal situation “well-chosen agents, in an agency constructed to channel 
their incentives correctly, can be left alone to determine the policy that the 
elected officials would themselves have chosen, given the time and resources” 
(Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, pp. 590-91). All other things being 
equal, therefore, in terms of the new economics of organisation delegation is a 
rational act. 
 In terms of political science, most attention has in effect focused on the 
problem of moral hazard. In this context, the literature has concentrated upon 
two basic issues associated with delegation. The first is known as agency 
‘shirking’. Otherwise called agency ‘loss’, ‘discretion’, or ‘drift’, shirking denotes 
“any form of noncompliance by the agent and results from a conflict of goals” 
(McCubbins and Page, 1987, p. 410). Slightly more specifically, agency discretion 
is said to consist of “the departure of agency decisions from the positions agreed 
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upon by the executive and legislature at the time of delegation and 
appointment” (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 589). The point to 
note here is that the agent may act in a self-interested manner or in a manner 
which is at least deliberately at odds with the expressed preferences of the 
principal. The second related, but nonetheless distinct, issue is known as agency 
‘slippage’. This is an “institutionally induced” (McCubbins and Page, 1987, p. 
411) problem, which occurs “when the structure of delegation itself provides 
perverse incentives for the agent to behave in ways inimical to the preferences of 
the principals” (Pollack, 1997, p. 108). The key element here is that individual 
actors within an agency may try to act in good faith and follow the preferences of 
principals, whereas the decision-making process of the institution may be such 
that the collective decision of the agency still diverges from the initial preferences 
of the principal. 
 In response to these problems, the literature on principal-agent theory has 
suggested two standard solutions: ex ante and/or ex post controls (ibid). Ex ante 
controls comprise “any actions that the executive or legislature can take, prior to 
agency choice, that influence the later goals of the agent or the set of feasible 
choices available to the agency. Such actions include the structuring of the 
agency itself, the denomination of its powers and jurisdiction, the specification of 
administrative procedures to be followed, and the type of personnel with which 
the agency is to be staffed …” (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 604). 
Ex post controls concern both oversight and sanctions. Oversight is usually 
deemed to consist of ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’. Here, police-patrol 
oversight “is comparatively centralized, active, and direct” (McCubbins and 
Schwartz, 1984, p. 166). It includes legislative hearings and special enquiries. By 
contrast, fire-alarm oversight “is less centralized and involves less active and 
direct intervention than police-patrol oversight” (ibid). It includes procedures 
 6 
that encourage citizens to bring agency discretion to the attention of principals. 
More straightforwardly, sanctions include budgetary controls, legislative veto 
over agency actions, the power to dismiss agency officials and so forth. 
 In addition to these responses, there are other non-standard solutions to 
the problem of agency delegation. For example, it may be possible to delegate 
power to multiple agents. In this case, the aim is to encourage “competitive 
interaction” (Ferejohn, 1999, p. 132) so that agents are encouraged to produce 
policy outputs that take account greater account of popular preferences.2 An 
alternative view suggests that researchers should concentrate on more 
unobtrusive forms of control and influence that principals might employ 
(Weingast and Moran, 1983; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989). Here, 
emphasis is placed on the particulars of the day-to-day relationship between the 
principal and the agent, including the rules that establish “unspoken” (Calvert, 
McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 606) agency expectations as to when 
principals may invoke sanctions. In this case, therefore, the relationship between 
principals and agents is affected not just by formal procedures but by informal 
practices as well. 
 All told, in the field of both economics and politics principal-agent theory 
is fundamentally concerned with institutional design. In terms of politics, the 
basic aim is to construct agencies in such a way as to avoid slippage and, perhaps 
above all, shirking. In the language of liberal democracy, the key task is to design 
institutions that carry out the wishes of the people. In section three, principal-
agent theory will be applied to the case of the ECB to clarify the logic 
underpinning the basic positions of both the supporters and the critics of the 
Bank. Prior to this analysis, though, the institutional design of the Bank needs to 
be sketched. 
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2. The institutional design of the European Central Bank 
 
The ECB is one of the most independent central banks in the world. The ECB’s 
statutory independence is derived from the relevant Articles and Protocols of the 
Maastricht/Amsterdam treaties. In this respect, the basic observation to be made 
is that the Bank exhibits both a high degree of economic and political 
independence. 
 The economic independence of the ECB is mainly derived from Articles 
105 and 108 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Here, for example, it is stated that: 
 
The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the 
Community (Article 105). ... When exercising the powers and 
carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national 
central bank, nor any members of their decision-making bodies 
shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or 
bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other 
body. The Community institutions and bodies and governments of 
the Member-States undertake to respect this principle and not to 
seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the 
ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their 
tasks (Article 108). 
 
Thus, although exchange rate policy is set by the Council of Ministers (Article 
111.2), the statutes indicate that the ECB has a primary mission to maintain price 
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stability and that it is the sole authority with the power to decide monetary 
policy. In this respect, the Commission or the Council has no power to veto the 
Bank’s monetary policy decisions. Indeed, in formal terms it has few, if any, ex 
post ways of influencing the Bank’s decisions. 
 The political independence of the ECB is derived from a number of other 
Treaty articles. So, for example, the Governing Council of the ECB is composed 
of a six-person Executive Board (a President, Vice-President and four other 
members) as well as the Governors of each national central bank participating in 
the single currency. Members of the Executive Board are appointed for eight-
year non-renewable terms by common accord of the governments of the member 
states at the level of heads of state or government, at the recommendation of the 
Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN), after consultation with 
the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB itself (European 
Communities, 1992, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank, Article 11.2). Moreover, members of the 
Executive Board must be appointed “from among persons of recognized 
standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters …” (ibid). 
In addition, the salaries of the members of the Executive Board are determined 
by Governing Council of the Bank (ibid, Article 11.3) and in effect Board 
members can only be retired if they have been found guilty of serious 
misconduct (ibid, Article 11.4). 
 The other main aspect of the Bank’s political independence concerns its 
formal reporting commitments. Here, the Treaty states that the Bank “shall 
address an annual report on the activities of the [European System of Central 
Banks] and on the monetary policy of the previous and current year to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and also to the European 
Council. The President of the ECB shall present this report to Council and to the 
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European Parliament, which may hold a general debate on that basis” 
(Amsterdam Treaty, Article 113 (3)). In addition, the Protocol states that the 
“ECB shall draw up and publish reports on the activities of the ESCB at least 
quarterly” (European Communities, 1992, Protocol on the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Article 15.1) and that a 
“consolidated financial statement of the ESCB shall be published each week” 
(ibid, Article 15.2). Finally, it is also indicated that the “President of the ECB and 
other members of the Executive Board may, at the request of the European 
Parliament or on their own initiative, be heard by the competent Committees of 
the European Parliament” (Amsterdam Treaty, Article 113.3). 
 Overall, the ex ante design of the ECB created an extremely independent 
institution in terms of both economic and political indicators of independence.3 
Moreover, in terms of ex post oversight the ECB is subject to only a minimum 
number of formal reporting requirements. In short, the ECB is an extremely 
independent monetary policy agency and was deliberately designed to be so. 
 
 
3. The debate about independent central banks and the ECB 
 
The institutional design of the ECB has provoked considerable political 
comment. There is an ongoing debate between two different sets of people who 
hold mutually exclusive viewpoints: one supportive of the ECB and one critical. 
Indeed, more often than not these positions are related not just to the position of 
the ECB per se but to the role of independent central banks more generally. In a 
recent article, Berman and McNamara (1999) highlighted three aspects of this 
more general debate: the theoretical element; the empirical element and the 
 10 
normative element. Each will be reviewed in turn and, where appropriate, will 
be applied to the ECB. 
 The first element of the debate concerns the theoretical rationale for 
central bank independence. This rationale is derived from the so-called 
‘expectations-augmented Phillips curve’. The original Phillips curve purported to 
show that there was a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. In this 
case, governments could supposedly manipulate the economy by allowing 
demand to rise in times of deflation and vice versa. Increasingly, though, this 
trade-off was challenged. It was argued that the public remembered that 
previous bouts of inflation had adversely affected their real wages and profits 
and reacted rationally to the prospect of future bouts by constantly revising their 
inflationary expectations upwards. The result was that whenever unemployment 
was below its natural level the public would continue to demand higher and 
higher wage, or price, increases and so inflation would accelerate. In other 
words, in the long-run the expectations-augmented Phillips curve was vertical. 
In this situation, the only way to bring down inflation was to reduce the level of 
inflationary expectations amongst the public. The best way to do this, it was 
argued, was by the adoption of a rule-based monetary regime (Barro and 
Gordon, 1983). In such a regime there would be clear monetary targets and 
publicly announced medium-term financial strategies showing that decision-
makers were serious about reducing inflation. In turn, this would reduce the 
level of inflationary expectations amongst the public. The corollary of this work 
was the argument that responsibility for managing the rule-based regime, and, 
hence, for setting monetary policy, should be transferred from governments to 
independent central banks. Politicians, it was argued, were not sufficiently 
credible to be able to reduce the level of inflation. They sacrificed the need to 
keep to medium-term inflationary targets in order to boost their short-term 
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electoral needs (the so-called time-inconsistency problem). Consequently, the 
level of inflationary expectations remained high. In this context, Rogoff (1985) 
argued that there were gains to be made by entrusting responsibility for 
monetary policy to an independent, conservative inflation-averse central bank 
that would establish a reputation for sound money. In so doing, it would resolve 
the time-inconsistency problem and drive inflationary expectations down. 
 For many people, the theoretical rationale for central bank independence 
is a compelling one. Moreover, there is a good case for arguing that the EMU 
process was driven at least in part by a powerful epistemic community that 
championed the need for a highly independent ECB on the basis of the above 
logic (Dyson, 1994). However, there are objections to the theoretical case. For 
example, Berman and McNamara (1999) argue that their is nothing special about 
monetary policy. Plenty of policy areas suffer from the equivalent of the time-
inconsistency problem. In fact, politicians, they say, “frequently shrink from 
prescribing bitter medicine for fear of paying an electoral price” (ibid, p. 3). Thus, 
either people should be willing to transfer policy making to independent 
decision-makers in every domain or they should be willing to do so in none. For 
their part, Berman and McNamara recommend the latter. A similar line of 
argument has been taken by Taylor (2000). He points out that even when so-
called ‘experts’ have been entrusted with a special decision-making 
responsibility, this does not mean that they will necessarily agree with each 
other. Moreover, these disagreements are just as likely to concern value 
judgements about welfare effects on different groups of citizens as purely 
technical matters of policy implementation (ibid, p. 186). Indeed, a similar point 
is made by Verdun and Christiansen (2000). For them, any belief that an 
institution like the ECB is “purely technical and/or non-partisan rather than 
political is flawed” (ibid, p. 173). In this case, the issue “lies less is the pursuit of a 
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Pareto-optimal resource allocation, but in the way in which the institutional 
arrangements respond to a wider social understanding and thereby manage to 
remain ‘unquestioned’” (ibid). All told, there are those who remain unconvinced 
of the theoretical case for central bank independence. 
 The empirical case for central bank independence is a result of the studies 
that have established a positive correlation between a high degree of central bank 
independence and a low level of inflation. One of the earliest studies of this sort 
argued that “there is a positive association between the legislation of a price 
stability objective and the achievement of a relatively non-inflationary and low 
variability monetary policy” (Parkin, 1978, p. 182). A slightly later but equally 
influential study reached a more general conclusion: “independent central banks 
have conducted monetary policies over the years that have been less 
accommodative to outside pressures than the policies of their less autonomous 
counterparts; consequently, their countries have experienced substantially lower 
rates of inflation” (Banaian et al, 1983, p. 13). Indeed, over the years the empirical 
case for central bank independence has been strengthened by the argument that 
there is no equivalent correlation between central bank independence and low 
growth. For example, Grilli et al famously concluded that “having an 
independent central bank is almost like having a free lunch: there are benefits but 
no apparent costs in terms of macroeconomic performance” (1991, p. 375). 
Indeed, some evidence has suggested that central bank independence may even 
be associated with positive growth (De Long and Summers, 1992, p. 14). 
 As with the theoretical rationale for central bank independence, the 
empirical case has also been criticised. In particular, it has been argued that the 
correlation between central bank independence and low inflation is spurious. In 
other words, while central bank independence may be a factor in bringing about 
low inflation, other factors may be just as important or maybe even more so. For 
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example, Posen has argued that the interests of the financial sector are crucial in 
determining the level of inflation. Thus, he states that “similar degrees of 
political independence will offer significant degrees of protection from inflation 
over time as the political situation alters” (Posen, 1993, p. 53) and he concludes 
that the “predicted anti-inflationary success of the European Central Bank … 
rests on the ECB’s political context, not on the institutional features of the bank 
itself” (ibid, p. 54). Similarly, Hall (1994) and Hall and Franzese (1998) have 
drawn attention to the importance of coordinated wage bargaining in the 
determination of the rate of inflation. On the basis of this logic, Hall and Franzese 
argue that the existing nature of coordinated wage bargaining procedures in 
Britain, Ireland and France may mean that these countries have something to 
gain from EMU by virtue of acquiring an independent central bank (ibid, p. 527). 
Equally, Greece, Portugal and Spain may also gain slightly. However, all other 
countries are likely to be net losers (ibid). Thus, again, for some people the 
empirical case for an independent ECB is not as strong as others would suggest it 
to be. 
 The final argument is a normative one. Here, there is a basic agreement 
that independent central banks should be accountable. At the same time, though, 
there is a clear difference of opinion as to whether the ECB meets this 
requirement. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the members of the Bank’s 
main decision-making authorities have spent a considerable amount of their time 
defending the Bank from the accusation that it suffers from a democratic deficit. 
The Bank’s position in this regard has been consistently repeated in the period 
since 1 January 1999. For example, the ECB’s 1999 Annual Report reiterated the 
Bank’s commitment “to the principles of openness, transparency and 
accountability” (European Central Bank, 2000, p. 129). Moreover, one of the 
members of the Bank’s Executive Board, Otmar Issing, indicated that Bank was 
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indeed true to these principles stating unequivocally that the ECB “is both 
accountable and transparent” (Issing, 1999a, p. 28). A similar position was 
adopted by the President of the Bank, Wim Duisenberg, who stated that the ECB 
“is fully independent, but also fully accountable to Parliament, Ministers and the 
public” (Duisenberg, 2000a, p. 15). Another member of the Bank’s Executive 
Board, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, reiterated this view, arguing that the 
Eurosystem “fulfils its accountability obligation, inter alia, by way of a 
comprehensive dialogue with political bodies” (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000, p. 6). 
Finally, the Bank’s sensitivity to the issue of democracy was underlined by 
further member of the Executive Board, Sirkka Hämäläinen, who confessed that 
bringing decision-making at the European level closer to citizens was “a matter 
of vital importance” to her (Hämäläinen, 1999, p. 1). 
 In stark contrast, however, critics of the Bank have argued that it is a 
highly unaccountable institution. In this regard, the Bank has been criticised by 
both left- and right-wing politicians. For example, in the 1992 referendum 
campaign in France the de facto leader of the ‘no’ campaign, gaullist politician 
Philippe Séguin stated that “when it comes to a question of monetary choices, the 
economic and social consequences of which are considerable, I believe that 
democratic control is always a better guarantee than technocratic 
irresponsibility” (in the supplement to Libération, 31 August, 1992, p. 9).4 The left-
wing British Labour MP, Dianne Abbott, was even more succinct, arguing that 
“monetary policy is too important to be left to central bankers” (Abbott, 2000, p. 
230). Academics too have underlined the undemocratic nature of the ECB. For 
example, prior to the start of Stage II of EMU Hirst and Thompson argued that: 
“[t]he effect of the ‘independence’ of the European central bank would be to 
allow virtually unaccountable officials to dictate economic policy, at a time when 
the central organs of the EU will still lack legitimacy and citizen identification” 
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(Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 162). Finally, practitioners too have criticised the 
ECB. For example, Willem Buiter,  a member of the Monetary Policy Committee 
of the Bank of England, has argued that: “[t]he legal framework, institutional 
arrangements and emerging operating practices of the ECB/ESCB are flawed 
and in urgent need of modification. At the very least, the ECB’s deficiencies pose 
a threat to its continued operational independence. Beyond that, they could put 
the common currency’s survival at risk. A threat to the common currency is a 
threat to the entire EMU edifice and to the continued success of the post-World 
War II European integration process” (Buiter, 1999, p. 205). 
 Overall, it is clear that there are opposing views about central bank 
independence. Moreover, it is also clear that these views are reflected in the 
theoretical, empirical and normative assumptions that underpin this debate. The 
rest of this article focuses on the normative issue surrounding the institutional 
design of the ECB. In so doing, it adopts a principal-agent approach.5 The 
advantage of such an approach is that the debate about ECB’s purported 
democratic deficit can be recast so as to highlight the essential differences 
between the two opposing camps, while at the same time maintaining a 
consistent terminology based on a common set of first principles. 
 
4. Recasting the debate in terms of principal-agent theory 
 
This section applies principal-agent theory to the debate about the accountability 
of the ECB. Here, the aim is not to judge whether the position adopted by the 
Bank’s supporters is ‘correct’ or whether its critics are ‘right’. Instead, the aim is 
simply to demonstrate how principal-agent theory can be used to defend the 
positions of those on each side of the debate. In this way, it simply reconstructs 
the views of the protagonists in the debate and reports what they would be likely 
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to say if they were to argue in principal-agent terms. Thus, principal-agent 
theory is being used as an heuristic device to identify the assumptions that 
underpin the debate about the accountability of the Bank. 
 
Principal-agent theory and the supporters of the ECB 
 
In terms of principal-agent theory the ECB’s position is consistent with the belief 
that there has been no agency shirking or slippage. According to this line of 
thought, it would be argued that the Bank was delegated the sole authority to 
conduct monetary policy and in carrying out this responsibility since 1 January 
1999 it has simply followed the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. In so doing, 
the Bank has been faithful to the clearly expressed preferences of the principal at 
the moment of delegation. On the basis of this reasoning, therefore, principal-
agent theory can be interpreted to suggest that the Bank does not suffer from a 
democratic deficit. The logic behind this argument can be justified in two 
different ways. 
 The first stresses the general preferences of the actors when authority was 
delegated to the Bank in the first place. Here, it can be acknowledged that the 
ECB has operational independence and, thus, that it enjoys great autonomy. In 
most principal-agent studies agency autonomy and shirking go together. After 
all, the usual assumption is that the more autonomy an agency enjoys, the more 
opportunity it has to act self-interestedly and diverge from the preferences of the 
principal. However, for the ECB, it might be argued, this is not the case. This is 
because the initial preference of the principal was precisely to delegate power to 
an autonomous institution. An independent ECB was the express wish of EU 
governments and, by extension, EU citizens as a whole. Here, therefore, anything 
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that the ECB does, at least within the confines of the Maastricht/Amsterdam 
treaties, can be considered democratic and should not be treated as shirking. 
 Representatives of the ECB have often based their arguments on this sort 
of logic when justifying their activity. Indeed, Issing has made explicit reference 
to principal-agent theory in this regard, stating that “the principal, which could 
be assumed to be collectively the people of the EU11, … has delegated the 
conduct of monetary policy to a specialised agent (the ECB) …” (Issing, 1999a, p. 
27). In a similar way, although without explicit reference to principal-agent 
theory, Hämäläinen has justified the Bank’s activity on the basis of the “fact that 
the participating countries handed over an important economic policy tool i.e., 
their monetary policy, to a common European institution …” (Hämäläinen, 1999, 
p. 2). Equally, the political underpinnings of the delegation process have been 
emphasised by the Vice-President of the Bank, Christian Noyer. He has argued 
that: 
the introduction of the euro and the establishment of the ECB 
constitute a new, important step in the process of European 
integration … This process is based on the political view that an 
integrated Europe is in the interest of stability, security and 
prosperity. The European integration process is primarily a 
political process with, of course, important economic aspects and 
benefits (Noyer, 1999a, p. 2). 
The logic behind all of these declarations is the same, namely that the Maastricht 
Treaty established an extremely independent central bank. As a result, the ECB is 
perfectly justified in acting autonomously because in so doing it is not diverging 
from the preferences of the principal as expressed at the time of the delegation. 
To put it another way, the citizens of EU member-states gave the ECB a blank 
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cheque to act autonomously. The Bank cannot be criticised, therefore, for 
jealously guarding this autonomy and maintaining its independence. 
 The second way in which the ECB’s autonomy can be justified in terms of 
principal-agent theory is similar but slightly more specific. The Maastricht Treaty 
specified the Bank’s primary objective to be the maintenance of price stability 
(see above). Moreover, the Treaty allowed the Bank to decide for itself exactly 
what was meant by this term. Thus, when the Bank decided that price stability 
should be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices for the euro area of below two per cent, and when it determines 
interest rate changes with a view to keeping inflation below this level, then it is 
perfectly justified in so doing. In other words, it cannot be considered to be 
acting in a way which diverges from the preferences of the principal at the time 
of delegation. Once more, therefore, principal-agent theory can be interpreted to 
suggest that the Bank does not suffer from a democratic deficit.  
 The representatives of the ECB frequently rely on this logic when 
justifying their actions. For example, Issing argues that accountability “simply 
means that we ‘do what we are supposed to do’” (Issing, 1999b, p. 508), namely 
maintain price stability. Even more explicitly, for Noyer accountability, or 
democratic responsibility as he puts it, is to undertake “to do what the Treaty 
requires us to do, which is to ensure price stability” (Noyer, 1999b, p. 6). Indeed, 
this is the logic of the ECB’s 1999 annual report. Here, in the section on public 
information and accountability, the report states that: 
The primary objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price 
stability in the euro area. This primary objective is the ultimate 
benchmark against which the performance of the Eurosystem has 
to be evaluated. The ECB has announced a quantitative definition 
of price stability which further specifies, in precise terms, the 
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yardstick against which the Eurosystem’s performance should be 
measured, thereby facilitating accountability (European Central 
Bank, 2000, p. 130). 
In other words, members of the ECB believe that they are acting in a manner 
consistent with the initial preferences of member-state governments (the 
principal)6 if they manage to limit the annual growth in the rate of inflation to 
less than two per cent. Indeed, they can act as autonomously as they may wish in 
this regard, within the confines of the Maastricht/Amsterdam treaties at least, as 
long as they can maintain the level of inflation below this level. The result is that, 
however much people (and politicians) may complain about the adverse effects 
of the ECB raising interest rates (or at least not lowering them), the Bank is still 
justified in acting independently because it can claim that it is simply following 
the preferences of those who delegated this power to the Bank in the first place. 
Again, therefore, principal-agent theory can be interpreted so as to suggest that 
the ECB is an accountable and democratically responsible institution.7 
 
Principal-agent theory and the critics of the ECB 
 
In contrast to the ECB’s position, principal-agent theory can also be used to 
justify the arguments of those who criticise the Bank. In this case, the logic of the 
previous sub-section is reversed. The assumption here would be that the ECB is 
guilty of shirking. Since the introduction of EMU, it might be argued, the 
preferences of the Bank and the principal have diverged. In this way, principal-
agent theory can be interpreted to suggest that the Bank has acted in an 
undemocratic manner and that it suffers from a democratic deficit. As before, 
this line of argument can be justified in two particular ways. 
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 The first places emphasis on the Bank’s secondary objective. Since 1 
January 1999, representatives of the Bank have repeatedly stressed that their 
fundamental concern is price stability. For example, Duisenberg has stated that 
“[a]ll other objectives are … subservient” to this end (Duisenberg, 2000b, p. 6). 
However, while this is indeed the Bank’s primary objective, it also has a 
secondary objective, namely to support the general economic policies in the 
Community (see above). The aims of these policies are set out in Article 2 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and they include promoting a 
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, and a high level of 
employment and social protection. Thus, the Bank may be considered to have 
shirked on the terms of its original delegation, and to have acted in an 
undemocratic manner, if can be shown to have ignored, or at least paid 
insufficient attention, to its second statutory objective. 
 The most high-profile person who has consistently been identified with 
this line of argument is the chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs, Christa Randzio-Plath.8 When ECB 
representatives have appeared before the Committee she has repeatedly argued 
that the Bank has failed to place sufficient importance on its secondary objective. 
For example, in the period immediately after the Bank became operational she 
complained to Duisenberg in the following terms: “There is a kind of asymmetry 
between the competence of acting in the ECB in questions of inflation and 
deflation and how do you interpret in the ECB Article 105 [sic]. I still fail to 
understand when the time is that the ECB must act in order to support 
employment” (Duisenberg, 1999a, p. 13). Later in the year, she pressed Noyer on 
the same issue: “In your opinion, is there a threshold for non-inflationary growth 
where the European Central Bank would actually have to intervene, where you 
would be supporting this policy through your interest rate policy and then 
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having to tread on the brakes?” (Noyer, 1999b, p. 16). More recently still, she 
quizzed Duisenberg again about the same matter. This time she was even more 
blunt, asking “[when] is the ECB going to make clear how it interprets Article 
105 and the secondary objective of the ECB?” (Duisenberg, 2000a, p. 7). Indeed, 
just to show that this was not a lone crusade, the same point was highlighted by 
the Committee’s rapporteur, Christopher Huhne. In his report on the ECB’s 
activities he recommended that the EP resolve to consider “it necessary, in the 
interest of transparency and credibility, for the ESCB to make clear how 
monetary policy is intended, over and above the objective of price stability, to 
contribute to a balanced and appropriate policy mix, with a view to promoting 
sustainable growth and employment” (Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, Report on the Annual Report for 1998 of the European Central Bank (C4-
0211/1999), p. 6). 
 This type of reasoning clearly runs counter the ECB’s position. It does not 
question the terms of Maastricht Treaty and, hence, the legitimacy of the initial 
delegation of power. Instead, it argues that since power was delegated the ECB 
has acted in a discretionary manner which runs counter to the expressed terms of 
the initial delegation. In short, the Bank has shirked. It has gone against the 
initial preferences of the principal by not taking full account of its secondary 
objective and, therefore, it can be deemed to have acted undemocratically. 
 A second line of argument takes a slightly different starting point. This 
argument suggests not that the ECB has gone against the initial preferences of 
the principal, but that these preferences have changed since this time. According 
to this line of argument, it can be acknowledged that the initial aim was to take 
monetary policy-making out of the hands of politicians, but now, it might be 
asserted, the principal wishes to recuperate some of this lost power and requires 
the Bank to be more responsive to its demands. In this way, principal-agent 
 22 
theory can be understood to imply that whatever the initial preferences of the 
principal may have been, the ECB is acting in an undemocratic manner because it 
is going against the preferences of the principal as they are expressed now. 
 The clearest expression of this train of thought can be found in the 
renewed attempts by the French government to try to establish an economic 
government, meaning a political counterweight to check the ECB.9 Immediately 
after taking over the presidency of the Council on 1 July 2000 the French 
government emphasised that this was one of the main aims of its term of office. 
So, for example, the official government statement entitled ‘A Europe of Growth, 
Employment and Innovation’ stated that “the French presidency will … suggest 
to its partners that the role of the Euro 11 should be enhanced, by further 
improving its operation, giving its proceedings greater visibility vis-a-vis the 
financial markets and heightening its political profile in the outside world”. 
Unsurprisingly, the same theme was underlined by the French Finance Minister, 
Laurent Fabius, who stressed that “explaining what we do better and giving 
more visibility to the Euro 11 will be one of the main aims of the French 
presidency” (interview in Le Monde, 4 July, 2000, p. III). 
 The fact that the French government is actively promoting this policy may 
be seen as an indication that the preferences of the principal have changed since 
the initial delegation of power as set out in the Maastricht Treaty. Needless to 
say, this position is at odds with the preferences of the ECB. The Bank considers 
any attempt to establish a political counterweight to the ECB to be detrimental to 
prospects for EMU and, hence, the Bank’s capacity to achieve price stability. In 
this case, therefore, principal-agent theory can be interpreted to suggest that the 
preferences of the principal and the agent have moved out of line and that the 
Bank is suffering from a democratic deficit. 
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5. Principal-agent theory and the reform of the ECB 
 
It is apparent, therefore, that principal-agent theory can be applied in ways 
which suit the arguments of both the supporters and the critics of the ECB. In 
this context, two points need to be made. The first is that this situation should 
not be seen as a weakness of the theory itself. On the contrary, it is a strength. 
Principal-agent theory clarifies the conflicting logics that underpin the positions 
held by the different actors. In this way, it helps us to conceptualise the debate 
surrounding the institutional architecture of the ECB more clearly. The second 
point is that, as stated previously, this article does not aim to determine which of 
the conflicting logics outlined above is ‘correct’. Quite the opposite, the aim of 
setting out the debate surrounding the ECB in principal-agent terms is to 
illustrate that both parties have intrinsically sound positions. Therefore, even 
though the rest of this article draws upon principal-agent theory to indicate how 
the ECB’s democratic deficit might addressed, this should not be taken as an 
endorsement of the Bank’s critics. Instead, in this section it is simply assumed 
that the Bank is guilty of shirking. On the basis of this assumption the aim is 
merely to show how principal-agent theory can be called upon to indicate the 
most appropriate ways in which the relationship between member-states and the 
ECB could be reformed so as to reduce the Bank’s putative democratic deficit. 
 In section one it was shown that there are standard and non-standard 
solutions to the principal-agent problem. The standard solutions comprised ex 
ante and ex post controls with the latter comprising police-patrol and fire-alarm 
oversight as well as sanctions. With regard to the ECB, ex ante controls, sanctions 
and fire-alarm controls, it will be argued, are inappropriate. By contrast, police-
patrol oversight and some non-standard solutions, it will be suggested, may be 
feasible. 
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 Ex ante controls are ruled out by the very design of EMU. The Maastricht 
Treaty established the institutional framework of EMU. However, as has been 
discussed, the aim of the principal at this time was to provide the ECB with 
operational independence. Thus, the decision was made ex ante not to impose a 
systematic set of checks and balances on the Bank. Moreover, the nature of the 
EU and, in particular, the realities of EMU are such that any renegotiation of the 
set of ex ante controls is unrealistic. The structures of the Bank can only be 
reformed by amending the Treaty and this is unlikely to happen. It is, as Pollack 
puts it, a “nuclear option”, meaning a “relatively ineffective and noncredible 
means of member state control” (Pollack, 1997, pp. 118-19). Moreover, even if 
member-state governments began to go down this path, the financial and 
economic repercussions would most likely be substantial as the markets would 
almost certainly react in a negative fashion. In practical terms, therefore, while 
critics of the Bank may wish to see Treaty amendments (for example, Buiter, 
2000, p. 243), it would be very difficult to increase the accountability of the ECB 
without actually undermining the institution’s credibility, threatening the 
stability of the euro even further and squandering any of the potential benefits to 
be gained from EMU. Thus, ex ante controls, meaning a renegotiation of the 
terms of the delegation, have in effect been ruled out. 
 The same is true for sanctions and fire-alarm oversight. In terms of 
sanctions the same logic applies as above. The Maastricht/Amsterdam treaties 
establishes few, if any, controls with regard to the ECB and the introduction of 
any such procedures would require Treaty amendment which, as with the 
previous point, is simply not possible at this stage. In terms of fire-alarm 
oversight the situation is slightly different. Here, such oversight is inappropriate 
because of the peculiarities of the ECB. In general, fire-alarm oversight is 
applicable when the principal is the legislature and when there is a well 
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established judicial procedure to which interested parties may have redress. In 
this situation, shirking may be brought to the attention of legislators either 
directly by constituents/lobbyists or indirectly through litigation. In the case of 
the ECB this situation simply does not apply. The principal is well aware of the 
ECB’s shirking, but there is nothing that can be done about it. In short, the alarm 
has been sounded but the fire brigade is not in a position to respond. Thus, 
sanctions and fire-alarm oversight may also be ruled out. 
 By contrast, there is some scope for increased police-patrol oversight and 
for the application of certain non-standard solutions to the principal-agent 
problem. In terms of police-patrol oversight, McCubbins and Schwartz state that 
an “agency’s activities might be surveyed by any number of means, such as 
reading documents, commissioning scientific studies, conducting field 
observations, and holding hearings to question officials and affected citizens” 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984, p. 166). On the basis that these activities are 
carried out not simply with the aim of surveying whether there has been shirking 
but to discourage the ECB from any further activity of this sort, then there is 
room for more police-patrol oversight of the ECB.10 In this regard, the European 
Parliament (EP) has a key role to play. 
 The EP is well placed to oversee the activity of the ECB because it can do 
so without the need for Treaty reform. Indeed, to date the EP has been 
moderately successful in expanding its influence over the Bank in this regard 
(Westlake, 1998). For example, at the time of his nomination as President, 
Duisenberg stated that he would be likely to withdraw his candidacy if “there 
was a wave of unanimous disapproval” (Duisenberg, 1998, p. 19), even though 
there was no statutory obligation for him to do so. Indeed, he implied that he 
might withdraw even if the level of disapproval was somewhat less strong. 
Similarly, the EP successfully managed to obtain Duisenberg’s agreement that he 
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would appear before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs four 
times a year. Moreover, the information from the initial meetings suggests that 
these appearances are somewhat more than just a mere formality. The President 
and other representatives have been subject to rigorous questioning and the EP’s 
opposition to some of the Bank’s policies has been clearly stated. Finally, there is 
some evidence to suggest that the EP has managed to encourage the Bank to pay 
greater attention to its secondary objective regarding growth and employment 
(see above). For example, in response to the EP’s persistent questioning in this 
regard Duisenberg has gone on record as saying that “we hate [deflation] as 
much as we do inflation” (Duisenberg, 1999b, p. 11). Indeed, he repeated this 
phrase almost word for word four months later (Duisenberg, 2000b, p. 11).11 
More importantly still, when the Bank decided to cut interest rates on 8 April 
1999 Duisenberg justified the decision on similar grounds, stating that “price 
stability and social stability are not conflicting, but supplementary and mutually 
reinforcing policy objectives. As economic policy-makers, we should keep this in 
mind when we formulate strategies to promote employment and social stability” 
(Duisenberg, 1999c, p. 3). 
 In these ways, then, without weakening the statutory responsibilities and 
the nascent credibility of the ECB, the EP has managed to increase the conditions 
for a greater degree of police-patrol oversight. In terms of future changes, the EP 
should consider debating more frequently the conduct of the ECB’s affairs even 
in the absence of the President or one of his representatives, passing resolutions 
concerning the Bank’s monetary actions, and presenting the public more clearly 
with its own preoccupations for the conduct of monetary policy. Any such 
developments, along with those that have already occurred, may help to reduce 
the divergence between the preferences of the principal and the agent with 
regard to EMU. 
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 In addition to increased police-patrol oversight, there is room for certain 
non-standard solutions to be considered. In this respect, there may be the 
opportunity to create competition between multiple agents and, hence, increased 
responsiveness of the ECB to member-state preferences. For example, if powers 
were delegated in the field of fiscal and social policies too, then the institutional 
conditions for a more balanced policy-mix may be facilitated. Needless to say, 
however, this could be a medium-term policy with an indeterminate guarantee 
of success. More realistically, member states might be encouraged to find ways of 
shaping the unspoken expectations of the EMU process. In their article Calvert, 
McCubbins and Weingast emphasise the importance of “the indirect and, in real 
life, subtle effect of the wishes of elected politicians upon the actions of unelected 
bureaucrats” (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 607). In this regard, 
there is the potential for the Euro group to play a key role.12 
 At present, the powers of the group are limited. It merely allows the 
exchange of economic information; it discusses budgetary policy; and it can 
comment on interest rate levels which, of course, are set by the ECB. Moreover, it 
is statutorily forbidden from seeking to influence the members of the decision-
making bodies of the ECB. So, it is not in a position to pressurise the ECB in any 
formal sense whatsoever. What is more, there is little to be gained by the group 
ignoring its mandate and provoking a public clash with the ECB so as to try to 
force the Bank’s hand. Such a clash would only be likely to make the ECB more 
intransigent and less likely to be receptive to the preferences of member states. 
Indeed, this was shown very clearly when the former German Finance Minister, 
Oskar Lafontaine, tried unsuccessfully to change the Bank’s policy in the period 
from January to March 1999. However, the group does have the potential to 
establish a more discrete and subtle dialogue with the ECB. If the group conducts 
itself in a discrete way, it has the opportunity to create a favourable and 
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mutually respectful environment within which the ECB may be encouraged to 
give greater importance to popular sentiment when making its decisions. In 
other words, it may encourage the Bank to cut interest rates. The best evidence 
for this point so far can be found in the events surrounding the Bank’s first 
interest rate cut in April 1999. This cut, it should be appreciated, followed 
Lafontaine’s resignation. In the press conference which followed the Bank’s 
decision Duisenberg was asked whether he had met governments halfway and 
had agreed to the cut so as to help the unemployment problem. In his reply the 
President of the ECB stated that he did “not have that much difficulty” with the 
reporter’s words (Duisenberg, 1999d, p. 6). 
 In this way, then, there is the potential for the Euro group to instil a 
heightened awareness of political sensitivities into the ECB’s way of thinking 
without reforming the Maastricht/Amsterdam treaties, without forcing a 
damaging public dispute between politicians and central bankers and, hence, 
without threatening the credibility of the ECB and the potential success of the 
EMU project as a whole. In other words, the Euro group has the opportunity to 
bring the preferences of the principal and the agent closer together. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The ECB is currently at the centre of a highly sensitive economic and political 
debate. Principal-agent theory helps to elucidate the foundations of this debate. 
Moreover, it also helps to propose realistic ways in which the Bank’s operations 
could be democratised if this is considered to be necessary. However, what does 
this article tell us about principal-agent theory itself? After all, if the same logic 
can be used to support two completely contradictory arguments, then does this 
not suggest that the theory is in fact somehow deficient rather than enlightening? 
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The answer is ‘no’ and for two reasons. The first is that the principal-agent 
approach is useful for heuristic pursposes. It establishes a framework with which 
to clarify particular issues. Moreover, it does so from a set of clearly identifiable 
first principles. In this way, there are no hidden assumptions and in the study of 
politics this is a definite advantage. The second reason is that the principal-agent 
approach is value-free. By focusing on the exercise of control within institutional 
arrangements, principal-agent theory forces attention to focus on positive rather 
than normative analysis. Any conclusions as to how relations should be 
structured can then be grounded in a clear understanding of how they actually 
work in practice. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 For a a politics-related overview with regard to the EU, see Doleys (2000). 
2 Ferejohn takes issue with this solution and focuses, instead, on the multiple opportunities 
available to principals that encourage agents “to compete with other options available to the 
principal in order to attract her support …” (Ferejohn, 1999, p. 133). 
3 For a measurement of the ECB’s independence, see Elgie (1998). 
4 All translations are by the author. 
5 The principal-agent approach has been applied to the economics of central banks by Walsh 
(1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993). 
6 Arguably, power was delegated to the ECB by multiple principals, namely the set of member-
state governments. For simplicity’s sake, however, this article assumes that power was delegated 
by a single principal, the Council of Ministers as a whole. 
7 A similar point is made by de Haan and Eijffinger (2000). They argue that governments should 
not have given the Bank itself the right to determine the operational definition of its primary 
objective. Indeed, this power, they believe, is one element in the Bank’s lack of accountability. 
However, they also argue that, given the Bank was granted this power, it cannot be blamed for 
using it (ibid, pp. 398-99). 
8 Note that prior to the start of the 1999-2004 session the equivalent institution was the Sub-
Committee on Monetary Affairs. 
9 This position was adopted by the French during the Maastricht negotiations and immediately 
prior to the commencement of EMU. In this way, it might be argued that this proposal does not 
represent a shift in preferences. However, to the extent that it was not reflected in the delegation 
of power set out in the Maastricht Treaty and that the French government has very publicly 
reiterated this argument during its 2000 presidency, then it can be argued that it represents at 
least a new and significant manifestation of a more established position. In this respect, it can be 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                 
considered as a shift in preferences for the purposes of reconstructing the debate in principal-
agent terms. 
10 This point is emphasised by Taylor (2000, p. 197). 
11 There is some evidence to suggest that the Bank is now willing to state not just that there is a 
ceiling, but that there is also a floor to its definition of price stability. See, for example, the ECB’s 
annual report for 1998 which states “the use of the word ‘increase’ in the definition [of price 
stability] clearly signals that deflation, i.e., prolonged declines in the level of the HICP index, 
would also not be deemed consistent with price stability” (European Central Bank, 1999, p. 49). 
12 This is a sub-group of ECOFIN comprising the Finance Ministers of all countries participating 
in EMU. It was formerly known as the Euro-11. 
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